Job Market Paper
Creditor Concentration and Debt Renegotiation
This project investigates how debt ownership concentration affects the likelihood of a successful out-of-court renegotiation.
Working papers
Research
My research examines financial contracting and institutional frictions in corporate distress, debt renegotiation, political activity, and bank funding.
Working Paper
CEO Turnover and Renegotiation Frictions
Abstract
We study the effects of CEO turnover on the conflict between the agents involved in a reorganization under Chapter 11. Further, to comprehend the channels where such an effect may arise, we examine the impact of CEO turnover on the likelihood of DIP financing and case duration. To do so, we employ the instrumental variable approach by using the competition level for executives in the labor market of the firm’s industry as an instrument for the variable CEO turnover. We find that changing the CEO increases conflict between the claimants, reorganization duration, and the likelihood of DIP financing. Our estimations for the heterogeneous effects of CEO turnover support the idea that information asymmetry is one of the main reasons behind the impacts of CEO turnover in bankruptcy.
Working Paper September 2026
When Political Opportunity Becomes Credit Risk: Evidence from Citizens United
Abstract
We examine how creditors price a landmark expansion in financially distressed firms’ opportunities to engage in corporate political activity. Using the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Citizens United and daily five-year CDS spreads, we find a non-monotonic response: CDS spreads increase most for firms with moderate pre-decision lobbying, rather than for those with the highest or lowest lobbying. These firms combine a demonstrated propensity to participate in politics with meaningful scope to expand that participation. CEO political donations and firms’ subsequent lobbying behavior reinforce this interpretation. We also exploit the ruling’s additional effect in states that previously restricted corporate independent political expenditures. The CDS response is particularly strong when CEOs’ prior donations reveal engagement with the headquarters-state political environment. Finally, the response is amplified among firms with high pre-decision net debt and attenuated when outstanding loans contain debt covenants, consistent with debt-related concerns. More broadly, our evidence shows that campaign-finance rules can have financial-market consequences even before any subsequent political expenditure or policy outcome is observed.
Working Paper
A Race to Fragility: Local Rivalry, Heterogeneous Depositors, and Panic-Based Runs
Abstract
Does local funding pressure make banks runnable? We develop a model in which competition for stable deposits shifts banks toward fragile heterogeneous depositors and raises withdrawal sensitivity conditional on fundamentals. Using U.S. bank-quarter data from 1984Q1 to 2024Q4, we instrument asset-liability mismatch with predetermined funding choices of nearby competitors. A one-standard-deviation increase in instrumented mismatch raises distress-linked withdrawals by 16.4 percentage points, one-year failure risk by 2.8 percentage points, and expected FDIC resolution losses by 1.0 percentage point. The results identify a local race to fragile funding that amplifies withdrawal risk and is consistent with greater panic-based run risk.